"Flying under the Radar: Quantifying Attention to Electoral Integrity of Foreign States with Text Analysis"

On May 10, 2016, Marinov will present at a seminar organized by the Business School of NPS on Election Wars, a working paper under review and part of a

Democracies' Deadly Electoral Compromise


Nikolay Marinov

William G. Nomikos

See full text in TNI:


Goemans, Hein and Nikolay Marinov. 2014. “Coups and Democracy”

We use new data on coup d’états and elections to document a striking development: whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1991 installed durable rules, the majority of coups after that have been followed by competitive elections. We argue that after the Cold War international pressure influenced the consequences of coups. In the post-Cold War era those countries that are most dependent on Western aid have been the first to embrace competitive elections after the coup. Our theory also sheds light on the pronounced decline in the number of coups since 1991.

Hyde, Susan and Nikolay Marinov. 2014. “Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation”

This article argues that when democracy is not yet institutionalized, leaders have little incentive to push for clean elections, in part because they are likely to face accusations of fraud from domestic opposition groups regardless of their true behavior. Reputable international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens; ability to coordinate against the regime when election fraud occurs, and discrediting “sore loser” protests.


National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy

Principal Investigators: Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov

On August 4th, 2015, we released an update to the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset. The data covers national elections from 1945-2012 in all countries except for micro-states (which are coming soon). A number of corrections are also incorporated into the Version 4 release, so please consider using the updated data even if you do not require the full time range in your research. 

Kinne, Brandon and Nikolay Marinov. 2013. "Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Relations"

How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in international crises? While the literature on credible signaling emphasizes the importance of electoral competition, it does not specify the minimal conditions that elections must satisfy in order to enhance the credibility of threats. We address this oversight by focusing on two fundamental properties of electoral institutions: (1) the degree of proincumbent bias and (2) the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of power following an opposition victory.


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