How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in international crises? While the literature on credible signaling emphasizes the importance of electoral competition, it does not specify the minimal conditions that elections must satisfy in order to enhance the credibility of threats. We address this oversight by focusing on two fundamental properties of electoral institutions: (1) the degree of proincumbent bias and (2) the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of power following an opposition victory.
The concept of electoral competition is relevant to a variety of research agendas in political science, yet the question of how to measure electoral competition has received little direct attention.
This is a pilot coding for a paper by the same name, and the book on different kinds of interventions, undertaken by foreign powers, in other countries' elections. The coding was done by Yale RA's (Baobao Zhang, Vinny Lindoso, thanks). An updated version of the coding continued at Uni Mannheim, where Vinny Lindoso, Marcela Ibanez, and Dennis Hammerschmidt are working on a bigger sample and with a rigorous codebook. From 2016 on, Kai Jaeger took over much of the coding.
Below is supporting material from the 2011-12 pilot, including information on the sources used.